Medvedev hit fewer forehands. The space he did not abandon may be the interesting part

In the sample discussed by Jeff Sackmann in January 2026, only 45% of Daniil Medvedev’s groundstrokes were forehands. The corresponding ATP figure in the analysis was 53%. Those numbers do not describe how often either wing won a point. They describe how often it was used. The distinction opens a question that the usual search for a bigger forehand can miss: what does a player gain by not having to move around the backhand?

The obvious answer is another reliable shot. The less obvious one is a different starting position for the next ball. If you can handle the backhand-side delivery where it arrives, you may not need to travel farther sideways merely to use your preferred stroke. That is a tactical possibility, not a measured explanation for every one of Medvedev’s choices. His 45% figure cannot reveal how much ground he saved or why each opponent sent the ball where they did.

The number is a clue, not a model to copy

Sackmann’s article began with a different puzzle: the potential value of a player using a forehand on both sides. His comparison used 2025 Match Charting Project data for 37 men with at least ten recorded matches each. In his Forehand Potency and Backhand Potency measures, Medvedev, Alejandro Davidovich Fokina and Alexander Zverev were the only three whose backhands rated above their forehands. This is a result within that sample and model, not an official ranking of the world’s best strokes.

The measures incorporate winners and forced errors, unforced errors, and shots leading to those outcomes. They therefore seek to capture more than the final highlight. But they are still constructed measures, built from matches selected and recorded by contributors. Opponents, surface and the situations in which a player chooses each wing influence the observations. A higher backhand rating is not a controlled experiment proving that the player should always choose it.

Medvedev’s forehand share is useful precisely because it interrupts a common assumption: a serious player must take ever more of the court with the forehand. It does not establish 45% as an ideal. Some players can create enough pressure from a runaround forehand to justify the extra movement. Others may face opponents who give them very different ball distributions. Copying the percentage without those conditions would be copying the answer to somebody else’s problem.

A forehand can succeed and still leave a bill

Consider a hypothetical right-handed club player receiving a manageable ball toward the backhand corner. There is time to move around it. The inside-out forehand lands deep, but the opponent reaches it in balance and redirects into the open forehand side. Our player now has a long recovery before the next contact. Judging only the depth of the first shot would call it a success. Judging the two-shot sequence might reach a different conclusion.

Now change one feature: the runaround forehand forces a stretched reply. The same starting movement may be worthwhile because the opponent cannot exploit the open court with comparable freedom. The lesson is not to forbid the runaround. It is to ask what the extra movement buys. A familiar swing is not by itself enough payment; the resulting pressure, angle or next-ball opportunity must be part of the account.

A backhand from nearer the original position can have the opposite profile. It may create less immediate damage while leaving less court exposed. That is useful only if its depth, height or direction prevents an easy attack. A short, tentative backhand does not become a good choice simply because you moved less. Court coverage and shot quality have to be evaluated together, rather than awarding one wing a permanent tactical privilege.

The hidden benefit may appear in your forehand numbers

Sackmann suggests a further effect: if a stronger secondary wing removes the need for some awkward forehands, the forehands that remain may perform better too. That does not mean improving a backhand has magically changed forehand technique. It means the selection of forehands has changed. Fewer difficult attempts from compromised positions can make the average look stronger. His article explicitly does not quantify that positional benefit.

This matters when reviewing your own progress. Suppose your forehand errors fall after a month of backhand work. More than one explanation remains possible. You may be moving better, choosing better balls, or encountering different opponents. You should not assign the whole improvement to one drill. But you can look for a specific pattern: are you no longer manufacturing forehands from situations in which a workable backhand was available?

The original article also estimates roughly four extra points per average match if a typical player’s backhand were hypothetically made as effective as his forehand. That is a counterfactual calculation, not the measured return from a training programme. It does not supply the costs of developing a second forehand, changing hands or playing the weaker side. Nor does it tell a club player that a better backhand is worth exactly four points. The more defensible practical idea is that a stroke can change the choices available around it.

Review the choice before prescribing the correction

For a practice session, ask a partner to begin live points with varied but manageable balls toward your backhand side. Leave both wings available; a drill that forces a backhand every time cannot examine the choice. Keep playing beyond your first reply. This is an editorial practice suggestion, not a routine attributed to Medvedev. Its purpose is to preserve the movement cost and the opponent’s opportunity to exploit it.

After a short block, recall a few runarounds. Separate those made early and in balance from those made late merely to avoid a backhand. Then note whether the opponent was defending, neutral or attacking on the next ball, and whether your recovery was realistic. These are rough practical observations, not a substitute for a tracking system. Their value lies in connecting the choice to what happened next.

Repeat with a clear backhand intention, such as sending a solid crosscourt ball with enough depth to keep the rally competitive. The aim is not to make both strokes identical. It is to see whether the backhand offers a playable alternative in the situations where the forehand currently costs too much. Keep the incoming difficulty comparable and resist declaring a permanent rule after one good block.

If the backhand option repeatedly leaves you under immediate attack, the next work may be its depth, contact quality or preparation. If it holds up but you still run around late, recognition and commitment may deserve attention. Those are different problems. A player does not solve the second simply by buying a more powerful racquet, and practising forehand winners alone may not expose either one.

Medvedev’s value here is not an instruction to become a backhand-dominant player. It is a reminder that the best forehand is not always the one you take the trouble to manufacture. Watch the space you vacate, the pressure your shot creates and the next ball you must cover. A backhand that lets you stay in the point without abandoning useful court position can improve more than one side of your game.